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Guide to the Alvin Roth Papers, 1960s-2000

Abstract

Roth is the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration at Harvard University. His research interests include game theory, experimental economics, and market design. He won the Nobel Prize in 2012.

Collection includes correspondence files, writings and research, writings by other economists, and some teaching material.

Descriptive Summary

Repository
David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University
Creator
Roth, Alvin E., 1951-
Title
Alvin Roth papers 1960s-2000
Language of Material
English
Extent
20.1 Linear Feet, 15075 Items
Location
For current information on the location of these materials, please consult the Library's online catalog.

Collection Overview

The collection offers a wealth of information from Roth's early career at the University of Pittsburgh, including his research and correspondence from that period, as well as drafts of some of his well-cited articles and writings. Approximately one-half of the material lies in the Correspondence and Working Papers series. This portion of the collection, arranged alphabetically by correspondent, includes professional correspondence as well as many drafts of scholarly articles. This arrangement replicates Roth's original filing system, which offers insight into his correspondence style and methodology for economics collaboration. Notable correspondents include Roy Weintraub, Robert Aumann, Ido Erev, Uriel Rothblum, and many more. Also included are various subject files, including Winner's Curse, Matching, and Learning.

Another notable component of the collection is Roth's Writings and Research, which includes both working drafts of Roth's own as well as data printouts and other components of his work in game theory and its real-world applications. These files have been grouped by article and are loosely arranged by date. Each article's co-writers or collaborators are noted if known.

The Writings by Others series has some overlap with the Correspondence and Working Drafts series, but for the most part the former includes only the article from Roth's fellow economists, without the collaborative or feedback aspect present in the latter series.

Roth's Teaching and Courseworkseries includes lecture notes as well as tools such as transparencies used during his economics lectures. Roth's own coursework at Stanford is also present, including notes, exams, syllabi, and lectures on topics such as microeconomics, competitive strategies, game theory, and choice theory.

Finally, the Grant Materials series is arranged by grant application, with each file including application materials, correspondence, reports, and finances relating to the grant.

Administrative Information

A majority of collections are stored off site and must be requested at least 48 business hours in advance for retrieval. Contact Rubenstein Library staff before visiting. Read More »

warning Access Restrictions

Collection is open for research.

Researchers must register and agree to copyright and privacy laws before using this collection.

All or portions of this collection may be housed off-site in Duke University's Library Service Center. The library may require up to 48 hours to retrieve these materials for research use.

Please contact Research Services staff before visiting the David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library to use this collection.

warning Use Restrictions

The copyright interests in this collection have not been transferred to Duke University. For more information, consult the copyright section of the Regulations and Procedures of the David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library.

Contents of the Collection

Roth's files of correspondence and working papers, arranged alphabetically by last name. Files largely consist of professional correspondence between Roth and fellow economists around the world, and usually include copies of a working paper or other scholarship. There are occasional subject files interspersed as well. Most files date from the late 1970s through the early 1990s.

Abeledo, Hernán
Box 1
Abreu, Dilip
Box 1
Albers, Wulf
Box 1
Alcalde, Jose
Box 1
Alger, Dan
Box 1
Alkan, Ahmet
Box 1
Anabarci, Nejat M.
Box 1
Arce M., Daniel G.
Box 1
Ashenfelter, Orley
Box 1
Aumann, Robert J.

Addditional legal-sized correspondence is housed in Box 18.

Box 1
Axelrod, Robert
Box 1
Baiman, Stanley
Box 1
Balinsku, Michel
Box 1
Barbera, Salvador
Box 1
Bartholdi III, John J.
Box 1
Beggs, Alan W.
Box 1
Bennett, Elaine
Box 2
Berg, Joyce E.
Box 2
Bergstrom, Ted
Box 2
Bikhchandani, Sushil
Box 2
Billera, Louis J.
Box 2
Binmore, Kenneth G.
Box 2
Bird, Charles
Box 2
Bjorner, Anders
Box 2
Blair, Charles
Box 2
Bolton, Gary E.
Box 2
Bondareva, O.N.
Box 2
Boorman, Scott
Box 2
Borm, Peter (Pem)
Box 2
Bornstein, Gary
Box 2
Brams, Steven J.
Box 2
Callen, Jeffrey
Box 2
Camerer, Colin F.
Box 2
Carducci, Olivia
Box 2
Carlin, Paul S.
Box 2
Carroll, Wayne
Box 2
Carter, Michael
Box 2
Cashdan, Elizabeth
Box 3
Cave, Jonathan A. K.
Box 3
Caves, Richard E.
Box 3
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
Box 3
Chang, Fwu-Rang
Box 3
Chatterjee, Kalyan
Box 3
Chew, Soo Hong
Box 3
Chun, Youngsub
Box 3
Chung, Kim-Sau
Box 3
Chvatal, V.
Box 3
Clark, Herbert H.
Box 3
Collins, Susan
Box 3
Cramton, Peter C.
Box 3
Crane, Fred
Box 3
Crawford, Vincent P.
Box 3
Crott, Helmet
Box 3
David, Paul A.
Box 3
Davis, Morton
Box 3
Debrock, Lawrence M.
Box 3
Driessen, T.S.H.
Box 3
Dubey, Pradeep
Box 4
Durrett, Rich
Box 4
Easley, David
Box 4
Eckel, Catherine
Box 4
Eliashberg, Jehoshua
Box 4
Elster, Jon
Box 4
Englebrecht-Wiggins, R.
Box 4
Erev, Ido
Box 4
Farrell, Joseph von R
Box 4
Felsenthal, Dan S
Box 4
Ferejohn, John A
Box 4
Fiorina, Morris P
Box 4
Forsythe, Robert
Box 4
Friedman, Daniel
Box 4
Fudenberg, Drew
Box 5
Gale, David
(2 folders)
Box 5
Gal-Or, Esther
Box 5
Gardner, Roy
Box 5
Gauthier, David
Box 5
Geanakoplos, John D.
Box 5
Granot, Daniel
Box 5
Green, Edward
Box 5
Green, Jerry R.
Box 5
Green, Leonard
Box 5
Guggenheim
Box 5
Gul, Faruk
Box 5
Gusfield, Dan
Box 5
Guth, Werner
Box 5
Halpern, Joseph
Box 5
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr.
Box 5
Harrison, Glenn W.
Box 6
Harsanyi, John C.
Box 6
Harstad, Ronald
Box 6
Hart, Sergiu
Box 6
Heckathorn, Douglas
Box 6
Heijmans, Johannes
Box 6
Herrero, Maria-Jose
Box 6
Hoffman, Elizabeth
(2 folders)
Box 6
Holland, Paul W.
Box 6
Holmstrom, Bengt
Box 6
Holt, Charles A.
Box 6
Howe, Eric D.
Box 6
Huang, Peter H.
Box 6
Hwang, J.S.
Box 6
Imai, Haruo
Box 6
Jaycees-TOYM (Ten Outstanding Young Men)
Box 7
Jones, Philip C.
Box 7
Kagel, John H.
Box 7
Kahn, Charles
Box 7
Kahneman, Daniel
Box 7
Kalai, Ehud
Box 7
Kamecke, Ulrich
Box 7
Kaneko, Mamoru
Box 7
Kihlstrom, Richard
Box 7
Kikuta, Kensaku
Box 7
Kim, Yong-Gwan
Box 7
Knez, Marc J.
Box 7
Knuth, Donald E.
Box 7
Kohli, Rajeev
Box 7
Kreps, David M.
Box 7
Kulakovskaja, T.E.
Box 7
Landsberger, Michael
Box 7
Laskey, Kathryn B.
Box 7
Learning (subject)
Box 7
Lehrer, Ehud
Box 8
Leopold-Wildburger, Ulrike
Box 8
Levin, Dan
Box 8
Lipman, Barton L.
Box 8
Loomes, Graham
Box 8
Lucas, William F.
Box 8
Matching (subject)
Box 8
Machina, Mark
Box 8
Malkiel, Burton G.
Box 8
Mandel, Michael J.
Box 8
Marshall, Robert C.
Box 8
Maskin, Eric
Box 8
Masso, Jordi
Box 8
McClennan, Edward
Box 8
McMillan, John
Box 8
Mertens, Jean-Francois
Box 8
Michener, H. Andrew
Box 8
Milgrom, Paul R.
Box 8
Miscellaneous correspondence, 1985-1986
Box 8
Mo, Jie-Ping
(2 folders)
Box 8
Moldovanu, Benny
Box 8
Mortensen, Dale T.
Box 8
Moulin, Herve
Box 8
Murnighan, Keith
Box 8
Myerson, Roger B.
Box 8
Nagle, Rosemarie
Box 8
Neale, Margaret
Box 8
Neelin, Janet
Box 8
Norman, Robert Z.
Box 9
Nydegger, Rudy V.
Box 9
O’Brien, John R.
Box 9
Ochs, Jack
Box 9
Okada, Akira
Box 9
Okuno, Masahiro
Box 9
O’Neill, Barry
Box 9
Osborne, Martin J.
Box 9
Ostrom, Elinor
Box 9
Palfrey, Thomas R.
Box 9
Peleg, Belazel
Box 9
Pittel, Boris
Box 9
Plott, Charles R.
Box 9
Pollak, Robert A.
Box 9
Pondy, Louis R.
Box 9
Postlethwaite, Andrew
Box 9
Prudencio, Yves Coffi
Box 9
Publishers' correspondence, 1984-1998
Box 9
Quint, Thomas
Box 9
Quinzii, Martine
Box 9
Radner, Roy
Box 9
Raiffa, Howard
Box 9
Rapoport, Amnon
Box 9
Rapoport, Anatol
Box 9
Rashid, Salim
Box 9
Rietz, Thomas A.
Box 9
Reny, Philip J.
Box 9
Rice, Peter
Box 10
Rob, Rafael
Box 10
Roberts, John
Box 10
Rochford, Sharon
Box 10
Romero-Medina, Antonio
Box 10
Ronn, Eytan
Box 10
Rosen, Sherwin
Box 10
Rosenthal, Robert W.
Box 10
Roter, V.I.
Box 10
Roth, Ted
Box 10
Rothblum, Uriel G.
(2 folders)
Box 10
Rubin, Jeffrey Z.
Box 10
Rubinstein, Ariel
Box 10
Samet, Dov
Box 10
Samuelson, Larry
Box 10
Samuelson, William
Box 10
Schmeidler, David
Box 10
Schotter, Andrew
Box 11
Schoumaker, Francoise
Box 11
Scotchmer, Suzanne
Box 11
Segal, Uziel
Box 11
Selten, Reinhard
Box 11
Sen, Amartya
Box 11
Shaked, Avner
Box 11
Shannon, Chris
Box 11
Shapiro, Roy D.
Box 11
Shapley, Lloyd S.
Box 11
Shenoy, P.P.
Box 11
Shmida, Avi
Box 11
Shubik, Martin
Box 11
Siegel, Sidney
Box 11
Sloan Foundation
Box 11
Smith, Lones
Box 11
Smith, Vernon L.
Box 11
Sobel, Joel
Box 11
Sondak, Harris
Box 11
Sonmez, Tayfun
Box 11
Sonnenschein, Hugo
Box 11
Sopher, Barry
Box 11
Sprague, John
Box 11
Stahl, Dale O.
Box 11
Steinberg, Richard
Box 11
Straffin, Philip D.
Box 12
Subramanian, Ashok
Box 12
Sunder, Shyam
Box 12
Sussangkarn, Chal
Box 12
Tauman, Yair
Box 12
Technion
Box 12
Telser, Lester G.
Box 12
Texas Instruments
Box 12
Thaler, Richard
Box 12
Thomson, William
Box 12
Tietz, Reinhard
Box 12
Tijs, S.H.
Box 12
Tucker, A.W.
Box 12
USIP (U.S. Institute of Peace)
Box 12
Van Damme, Eric
Box 12
Vande Vate, John
Box 12
Verrecchia, Robert
Box 12
Vilkas, Eduardas
Box 12
Villamil, Anne P.
Box 12
Wako, Jun
Box 12
Weber, Robert James
Box 12
Weintraub, Roy
Box 12
Winner’s Curse (subject)
Box 12
Winship, Christopher
Box 12
Winter, Eyal
Box 12
Wolinsky, Asher
Box 12
Wooders, M. Holtz
Box 12
Young, H.P.
Box 12
Yuan, Yufei
Box 12
Zame, William R.
Box 12
Zamir, Shmuel
Box 12
Zhou, Lin
Box 12
Zoffer, H.J.
Box 12
Aumann, Robert
Box 18
Handbook of Experimental Economics, 1988-1991
Box 18
Correspondence 1983-1986
Box 25

Drafts, correspondence, and data from a selection of Roth's many journal articles. Includes correspondence between Roth and his co-writers, as well as some publishers' correspondence. Arranged loosely by date, although many articles span several years and thus do not fit in a precise chronological order. Also included at the end of the series are research and notes on game theory.

Roth: Electrostatic Charge on Aircraft in Flight, 1969
Box 13
Roth: Self-Supporting Equilibria in the Supergame, 1975
Box 13
Roth: A Note on Cooperative Games with Varying Power, 1975
Box 13
Roth: Interpersonal Comparisons and Equal Gains in Bargaining, 1978
Box 13
Roth: Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts, 1978
(2 folders)
Box 13
Roth: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, 1978-1979
(2 folders)
Box 13
Roth: An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games, 1979
Box 13
Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler: Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem, 1979
Box 13
Roth and Malouf: Game Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining, 1979
(Folder 1 of 3)
Box 13
Roth and Malouf: Game Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining, 1979-1982
(Folders 2-3 of 3)
Box 14
Roth: Further Analysis of the Resident Match, 1981
Box 22
Roth: On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Reply to Aumann, 1981-1984
(2 folders)
Box 14
Roth: The National Resident Matching Program: An Organizational Analysis from a Game-Theory Perspective, 1982
Box 22
Roth: Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions, 1983
Box 22
Roth and Murnighan: Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining, 1983
Box 14
Roth and DeBrock: The Rules of the Game: Labor Management Negotiations and Major League Baseball, 1983-1985
Box 22
Roth: The College Admissions Problems is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem, 1984
Box 22
Roth: Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets, 1984
Box 22
Roth: Misrepresentation and Stability in the Marriage Problem, 1984
Box 22
Roth: A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining, 1984
Box 22
Ochs and Roth: A Further Comment on Experimental Economics: "Privacy" as an Experimental Condition, 1985
Box 22
Roth: Further Thoughts on the Power of Alternative: An Example from Labor-Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball, 1985
Box 22
Roth: Game Theory and Experimental Economics, 1985
Box 22
Roth: Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, 1985-1986
Box 22
Roth: On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets, 1985
Box 22
Roth: Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement Settlements, 1985
Box 22
Roth and Sotomayor: Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets, 1985-1987
Box 22
Roth: Mutual Restraint in Tree Swallows: Reinterpretation of the Data and Remarks on the Empirical Testing of Game-Theoretic Models, 1986
Box 22
Roth and Mongell: A Note on Job Matching with Budget Constraints, 1986
Box 22
Roth: On the Non-transferable Utility Value: A Reply to Aumann, 1986
Box 22
Roth and Sotomayor: The College Admissions Problem Revisited, 1987 (2 folders)
Box 22
Murnighan, Roth, Schoumaker: Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study, 1987
Box 22
Roth: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining and Related Strategic Models and Experimental Evidence, 1988 and undated
(3 folders)
Box 23
Roth: "Common, Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets", included in Game Theory and Applications vol., 1988
Box 23
Roth et al: The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence, 1988
(3 folders)
Box 23
Roth: Laboratory Experiments in Economics: A Methodological Overview, 1988
Box 23
Roth: National Science Foundation Proposal (rejected), 1988
Box 14
Roth: Risk Aversion in Multi-Person Bargaining over Risky Agreements, 1988
Box 23
Roth and Ochs: An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining, 1988-1989
(2 folders)
Box 23
Roth and Sotomayor: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications- chapter on matching, 1988-1989
Box 23
Roth and Vate: Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching, 1988-1989
Box 23
Roth: Risk Aversion and the relationship between Nash's solution and subgame perfect equilibrium of sequential bargaining, 1988-1989
Box 23
Roth: "Handbook"/ Bazerman manuscript collaboration, 1989
Box 23
Roth and Mongell: Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism, 1989
Box 23
Roth: Two-Sided Matching with incomplete information About Others' Preferences, 1989
Box 23
Roth and Kagel: Comment on Harrison vs. Cox, Smith, and Walker: Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions, 1990
Box 23
Roth: Game Theory as a part of Empirical Economics, 1990
Box 23
Roth: Let's Keep the Con out of Experimental Econ: A Methodological Note, 1990
Box 23
Roth and Vate: Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms, 1990
Box 23
Roth: A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians in the UK, 1990
Box 25
Roth, et al: Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 1990-1991
(2 folders)
Box 24
Roth and Prasnikar: Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games, 1990-1991
(2 folders)
Box 24
Maulitz and Fox: The Bureau of Health Professions: An Analytical History, 1991
Box 24
Mongell and Roth: Figures from AER article, 1991
Box 14
Roth and Sotomayor: Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of 2-sided Matching, 1991-1992
Box 14
Roth and Kagel: Handbook of Experimental Economics, 1992
Box 24
Prasnikar and Roth: Considerations of Fairness and Strategy (graphics for Quarterly Journal of Economics), 1992
Box 18
Roth: Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality - Torino Conference, 1992-1993
Box 15
Roth and Xing: "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions", 1992-1993
Box 24
Roth: Keep Con out of Experimental Econ, 1993
Box 15
Roth: "On the Early History of Economics", 1993
Box 24
Kagel and Roth: The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets, 1993-1997
(4 folders)
Box 16
Slonim and Roth: Financial Incentives and Learning in Ultimatum and Market Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic, 1993-1994
(Folder 1 of 6)
Box 16
Roth: Bargaining Experiments reprint permissions, 1994
Box 24
Roth: Individual Rationality as Useful Approximation - Tversky's Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, 1994
Box 15
Roth and Kagel: Handbook of Experimental Economics, 1994-1998
(2 folders)
Box 24
Roth and Xing: Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Cleaning, 1994-1996
(2 folders)
Box 15
Roth and Erev: Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term, 1995
(2 folders)
Box 24
Roth and Erev: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games..., 1995-1997
(2 folders)
Box 15
Roth: Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks - Lessons Learned, 1995
Box 15
Slonim and Roth: Financial Incentives and Learning in Ultimatum and Market Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic, 1995-1997
(Folders 2-6 of 6)
Box 17
Roth and Rothblum: Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets, 1995-1998
(3 folders)
Box 16
Roth, Blum, Rothblum: "Vacancy Chains: Equilibrium in Senior-Level Labor Markets", 1996
(2 folders)
Box 24
Roth and Peranson: Effects of Change in the NRMP Algorithm, 1996-1997
(3 folders)
Box 15
Roth and Sotomayor: Existence of Stable Outcomes for an Unified Matching Market, 1997
Box 16
Erev and Roth: Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games, 1997
Box 25
Peranson and Roth: Redesign of Matching Market for American Physicians, 1997
Box 25
Roth and Rothblum: Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets- In Search of Advice for Participants, 1997
Box 25
Kagel and Roth: The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment..., 1997-1998
Box 25
Roth, Erev, Slonim: Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations, 1998
Box 25
Slonim and Roth: Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games- An Experiment in the Slovak Republic, 1998
Box 25
Roth: Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets- In Search of Advice for Participants; with Rothblum, 1998
Box 25
Roth: Cooperative Games, undated
Box 17
Roth: Evolutionary Stable Strategies, undated
Box 17
Roth: Games with infeasible computations, undated
Box 25
Roth: Instructions on Risk Aversion simulation printouts, undated
Box 17
Erev and Roth: Learning, reciprocation, and the value of bounded rationality, undated
Box 25
Roth: National Resident Matching Program Algorithm, undated
Box 25
Roth: Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching, undated
Box 25
Game theory
Box 18
Game theory experiment print-outs
(3 folders)
Box 18
Two economic texts in Yiddish
Box 20
Curriculum Vitae, 1980s-1990s
Box 25
Navy Personnel Recruitment documentation, 1983-1984
Box 25
AMCAS- Medical School Application Procedures, 1984
Box 25
NRMP Collaborations and Correspondence, 1985
Box 25
NRMP Directories
(2 folders)
Box 25
NRMP Notes
Box 25

Drafts and articles sent to Roth but written by other economists. Files are arranged alphabetically by author.

An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value, 1983
Box 19
One the NTU Value
Box 19
Power and Public Goods
Box 19
Rejoinder
Box 19
Value, Symmetry, and Equal Treatment
Box 19
Bendor and Swistak: Evolutionary stability of cooperation, 1998
Box 19
A Characterization of Polyhedral Market Games
Box 19
On Games without Side Payments Arising from a General Class of Markets, 1973
Box 19
Market Representations of n-Person Games, 1973
Box 19
Decentralized Decision-Making in Two-Sided Matching, 1992
Box 19
Measuring the Instability in Two-Sided Matching Procedures, 1993
Box 19
Burrows, Paul, and Graham Loomes: The Impact of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior, 1992
Box 19
Friedman, Eric, 1996-1997
Box 19
Gardner, Roy: n-Transfer Value and Fixed Price Equilibrium in Two-Sided Markets, 1983
Box 19
Harrington, Warren: The Genossenschaften, 1973
Box 19
Hart, Sergiu: Non-transferable Utility Games and Markets: Some Examples and the Harsanyi Sol.
Box 19
Holt, Charles A.: The Effect of Market Power on the Direction of Convergence in Oral Double Auctions
Box 19
Hughes, John S.: A Note on Stochastic Dominance and Preference, 1992
Box 19
Nalbantian, Haig: Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System, 1991
Box 19
Shafer, Wayne J.: On Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation, 1977
Box 20
Simon, Herbert: The Game of Chess
Box 20
Sobolev, A.I.: The Characterization of Optimality Principles in Cooperative Games by Functional Equations, undated
Box 20
Various authors: requests for feedback, 1997 and undated
Box 20

Lecture notes and transparencies from Roth's courses, including a mini-course of four lectures on game theory taught by Roth in 1980. Also includes coursework from Roth's time at Stanford.

Lecture notes on Nash and Utility of Bargaining, 1977
Box 20
Game theory class transparencies and notes
Box 20
Transparencies with simple games, undated
Box 20
Introduction to non-cooperative games, undated
Box 20
Mini-course on Game Theory, 1980
(4 folders)
Box 20
Analysis of Competitive Strategies, 1973
Box 21
Axiomatic Foundations of Choice Theory, 1972
Box 21
Class notes, undated
Box 21
Coursework: Lattices, 1974
Box 21
Game theory notes, 1970s
(2 folders)
Box 21
Microeconomics
Box 21
Syllabi, bibliographies, and lecture notes, 1972-1976
Box 21
Game Theory reading list
Box 25

Applications, correspondence, and financial materials from Roth's grant applications.

Alfred Sloan Foundation: Entry-level labor markets for elite professionals, 1988
Box 26
Russel Sage Foundation: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, 1988
Box 26
NSF: Game-Theory Models of Bargaining, 1988-1989
Box 26
NSF: Coordination and operation of two-sided matching markets- theory and evidence, 1989
Box 26
NSF: Coordination and operation of two-sided matching model- theory and evidence, 1988-1990
Box 26
NIH: The Market for Physician Specialties, 1991
(3 folders)
Box 26
NSF: Jumping the Gun: Intertemporal instability in two-sided matching and related markets, etc., 1992
(2 folders)
Box 26
NSF: Low (rationality) Game Theory vs. High: experimental investigation of learning and adaptive behavior, 1995
Box 26
Citicorp: Performance, Pay, and Promotion: How Admin Procedures Interact with one Another, 1995
Box 26
NSF: Matching in Centralized and Decentralized Markets, 1995-1997
(2 folders)
Box 26
NSF: Towards a Cognitive Game Theory, 1998
Box 26

Historical Note

Alvin Roth was born on Dec. 18, 1951. He graduated from Columbia University in 1971, and earned a masters (1973) and Ph.D. (1974) from Stanford University in operations research. Roth went on to teach economics and business administration at the University of Illinois from 1974-1982, and at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-1998. In 1998, he became full faculty at Harvard University, and remains there today.

Roth's work focuses on game theory, market design, and experimental economics. He has worked on a variety of real-world projects, including the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) system, responsible for matching medical residents with respective programs; the New York City and Boston public school systems' high school assignment selection methods; and the New England Program for kidney exchanges between incompatible partners. He is a Guggenheim Fellow (1983-1984), an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellow (1984-1986), and a fellow at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has won the Texas Instruments' Foundation Founders' Prize (1980) and the Operations Research Society of America's Lanchester Prize (1991). In 2012, he and Lloyd Shapley won the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Honor of Alfred Nobel (commonly known as the Nobel Prize) for their work in "the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design." He has also authored numerous books and over 70 peer-reviewed journal articles.

Subject Headings

Preferred Citation

[Identification of item], Alvin Roth Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University.

Provenance

The Alvin Roth Papers were received by the David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library as a gift in 2011.

Processing Information

Processed by Carrie Mills, Meghan Lyon, August 2011

Encoded by Meghan Lyon, August 2011; updated by Nicole Rudden and Meghan Lyon, October 2012

Accession(s) described in this finding aid: 2011-0159, 2012-0128

Descriptive sources and standards used to create this inventory: DACS, EAD, NCEAD guidelines, and local Style Guide.

This finding aid is NCEAD compliant.